HY-01

Baseline Field Modified by Unauthorised Role

Hygiene

Default severity: high
ProcessMetricsQuality

What it detects

Configured baseline date fields were modified by a role not in the configured authorised roles list.

Detection formula

baseline_fields = config.hygiene.baseline_fields // e.g. \[\'baseline_start\',\'baseline_end\'\] authorised_roles = config.hygiene.baseline_authorised_roles // e.g. \[\'PM\', \'Scrum Master\', \'Programme Manager\'\] IF field_change.field IN baseline_fields AND changer.role NOT IN authorised_roles THEN FLAG

Examples in practice

  • Baseline fields or story data are edited outside agreed roles or left incomplete.
  • Changelog sparsity makes it hard to trust historical metrics.
  • A team shows configured baseline date fields were modified by a role not in the configured authorised roles list while baseline fields is set to Configured per workspace.

Suggested response

Reduce silent edits—enforce who may change baselines and keep story data complete.

Coaching playbook

Symptom

Configured baseline date fields were modified by a role not in the configured authorised roles list.

Why it matters

When "Baseline Field Modified by Unauthorised Role" keeps appearing, the team is signalling a repeatable process gap. Left unexamined, the pattern hides where work really stalls and makes improvement metrics harder to trust.

What you can achieve

Reduce silent edits—enforce who may change baselines and keep story data complete.

Facilitation questions

  • What system change would stop "Baseline Field Modified by Unauthorised Role" from firing again?
  • What do the cited issues have in common — same root cause or same workaround?
  • Who owns the two-week experiment and how will we verify on the next import?

Run this rule against your own tracker data with Flow Analyzer.

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HY-01: Baseline Field Modified by Unauthorised Role — FlowAnalyzer